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The Supreme Court Strikes Down the Public
Broadcasting Editorial Ban: Federal
Communications Commission v. League of
Women Voters
In Federal Communications Commission v. League of Women Voters, the
United States Supreme Court struck down a statute on first amendment
grounds which prohibited public broadcasters from editorializing. Those who
favor the deregulation of broadcasting and the institution of a free market
system hail the decision as a rare step in the right direction, after years of
unquestioned congressional right to freely regulate broadcasting. They point
to the Court's apparent willingness to reconsider its historical view of broad-
casting, which has always received less first amendment protection than the
print medium. However, the Court confirms its longstanding view that
broadcasting may be regulated to maximize the freedom of speech for all
concerned.
I. INTRODUCTION
Federally-funded public broadcasting stations are prohibited by
section 399 of the Public Broadcasting Act of 19671 from editorializ-
ing on controversial issues. In Federal Communications Commission
v. League of Women Voters,2 the Supreme Court considered for the
first time whether section 399 violates the first amendment rights of
public broadcasters. Taking into account the interplay between the
rights of the broadcaster, his audience, and the limited first amend-
ment protection historically given to broadcasting, the Court ruled
that section 399 was in fact unconstitutional.
This note examines the historical background of broadcast regula-
tion, public broadcasting, and congressional spending power, and fur-
ther analyzes the line of reasoning used by the Court in reaching its
decision. The author concludes that League of Women Voters has
the overall impact of reaffirming broadcast regulation and audience
first amendment rights, despite the claim by some that this case rep-
resents a victory for deregulation.
1. 47 U.S.C. § 399 (1982) provides in pertinent part: "No noncommercial educa-
tional broadcasting station which receives a grant from the Corporation [for Public
Broadcasting] . .. may engage in editorializing."
2. 104 S. Ct. 3106 (1984).
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. Federal Regulatory Power Over Broadcasting
The development of radio heralded a new era in the field of com-
munications. Congress initially viewed the invention as a potential
lifesaving device, and, in 1910, enacted a statute requiring all United
States ocean-going ships to carry radios in case of emergency. 3
Increased usage of the electromagnetic spectrum by land-based am-
ateur broadcasters, who frequently interfered with ship-to-shore
transmissions, resulted in pressure from the military for a compre-
hensive regulatory scheme.4 Congress responded by enacting the Ra-
dio Act of 1912,5 which empowered the then-Secretary of Commerce
and Labor to grant broadcasting licenses and to assign each licensee a
specified wavelength slot of the electromagnetic spectrum.
The number of broadcast licensees increased prolifically in the
early 1920's,6 prompting alarmed industry leaders to request further
regulation by Congress.7 The existing congressional authority to reg-
ulate radio,8 which rested on the commerce clause,9 was soon found
to be too weak to meet the growing needs of the fledgling industry.
The Court in Hoover v. Intercity Radio Co.'0 confirmed what some"
had already suspected: the Secretary of Commerce had no power to
refuse an application for license renewal.12 Governmental power
was further weakened by a decision forbidding the Secretary from
regulating the operations of broadcast licensees.13
In the wake of these chaotic developments, Congress enacted the
Radio Act of 1927.14 The Federal Radio Commission15 was estab-
3. 36 Stat. 629 (1910).
4. D. PEMBER, MASS MEDIA LAW 384 (1977).
5. 37 Stat. 302 (1912) (repealed 1927).
6. The number of broadcasting stations in the United States increased from 60 in
1922 to 588 in 1923 alone. R. McMAHON, FEDERAL REGULATION OF THE RADIO AND
TELEVISION BROADCAST INDUSTRY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1927-1959, at 19 (1979).
7. Id. at 18-19.
8. See 24 Op. Att'y Gen. 100, 101 (1902), which surmises that wireless telegraphy
(an early form of radio transmitting Morse Code) falls into the interstate commerce
category and hence is subject to federal regulation.
9. "The Congress shall have Power ... To regulate Commerce with foreign Na-
tions, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 8, cl. 3.
10. 286 F. 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
11. See 29 Op. Att'y Gen. 579, 580-81 (1912) (Congress did not intend to place any
discretion in the Secretary of Commerce concerning the issuance of licenses.).
12. The circuit court reasoned that the Secretary, as empowered by the Radio Act
of 1912, carried out a mere ministerial function with regard to the issuing of broadcast
licenses. The only discretionary function available to him was the selection of the
wavelength bands. 286 F. at 1006-07.
13. United States v. Zenith Radio Corp., 12 F.2d 614 (N.D. Ill. 1926). "There is no
express grant of power in the act to the Secretary of Commerce to establish regula-
tions." Id. at 617.
14. 44 Stat. 1162 (1927) (repealed 1934).
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lished to issue licenses in the furtherance of the "public convenience
or interest or ... necessity" 16 and to regulate the use of the assigned
frequencies.17 In addition, the Communications Act of 193418 created
the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)19 to regulate all ra-
dio,20 telephone, and telegraph concerns, thereby centralizing govern-
ment control over the entire communications industry.2 1
It soon became apparent that the first amendment 22 applied differ-
ently to broadcasting than it did to other modes of expression. The
broadcasting industry began to express a desire for less and not more
regulation, and sought to test the constitutionality of content-based
restrictions. This challenge took form in National Broadcasting Co.
v. United States,2 3 where the Supreme Court held, in part, that con-
tent-based review of a licensee's programming may be considered in
determining whether the station has acted in the public interest, and
hence ought to have its license renewed.24 The Court reasoned that a
broadcast licensee does not have a first amendment right to forever
monopolize its assigned frequencies, free of any duty to the broadcast
audience.25
The Court's primary justification for this regulatory power rests in
15. The Commission was headed by five commissioners appointed by the Presi-
dent for terms of six years. A maximum of three commissioners could belong to the
same political party; all were forbidden from having any financial interest in the in-
dustry. Id. at 1162-63.
16. Id. at 1163-64.
17. Congress' power to regulate radio by means of the 1927 Act was affirmed in
General Electric Co. v. Federal Radio Comm'n, 31 F.2d 630 (D.C. Cir. 1929), on the the-
ory that a lack of regulation would result in chaos, rendering "this peculiar public util-
ity. . . practically useless." Id. at 633.
18. 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (later codified at 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1982)).
19. The FCC was governed in a manner similar to that of the Federal Radio Com-
mission. See supra note 15. The most notable change was an increase in the number
of commissioners to seven, of which four could belong to the same political party. 47
U.S.C. § 154 (1982).
20. The 1934 Act substantially incorporated the provisions of the 1927 Act so far as
radio was concerned. See 1 A. SOCOLOW, THE LAW OF RADIO BROADCASTING 55 (1939).
21. Id.
22. "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press .... U.S. CONST. amend. I.
23. 319 U.S. 190 (1943). NBC's argument centered on the purported unconstitu-
tionality of the FCC's "chain broadcasting" regulations (F.C.C. Rag. 3.101-3.108, as
amended Oct. 14, 1941), which governed the "simultaneous broadcasting of an identical
program by two or more connected stations"-modernly known as "networking." 319
U.S. at 194 n.1. The Court found such regulations were properly founded on a basis of
power supplied by the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 303 (1982), which
granted the FCC the ability to regulate broadcasting networks. 319 U.S. at 217.
24. Id. at 226-27.
25. Id.
the concept of "spectrum scarcity." 26 This postulates that the limited
number of possible wavelength allotments require a different appli-
cation of the first amendment than would be used for other forums.2 7
Other rationale advanced over the years supporting the idea of broad-
casting uniqueness have been the "fiduciary for the public trust" con-
cept of the broadcaster2S and the "pervasive presence" of broadcast
signals.2 9
The gap between first amendment application to broadcasting and
to newspapers30 was further widened by Red Lion Broadcasting Co.
v. Federal Communications Commission.31 In Red Lion, the
Supreme Court upheld the "fairness doctrine," and FCC regulation32
requiring the proponents of opposing points of view to be allowed
equal time in response to an editorial opinion or personal attack ex-
pounded by a broadcasting station.3 3 The goal of producing an in-
formed public is thereby enhanced by the presentation of both sides
of an issue. In the absence of such a regulation, broadcast time would
be available only to the highest bidders, who would thereby be per-
26. Justice Frankfurter best summed up the scarcity rationale: "Unlike other
modes of expression, radio inherently is not available to all. That is its unique charac-
teristic, and that is why, unlike other modes of expression, it is subject to government
regulation. Because it cannot be used by all, some who wish to use it must be denied."
Id. at 226.
27. But see Fowler & Brenner, A Marketplace Approach to Broadcast Regulation,
60 TEX. L. REV. 207, 221-26 (1982), in which FCC Chairman Mark Fowler takes the
position that the "spectrum scarcity" rationale fails to stand up modernly in light of
the availability of low power television, over-the-air subscription television, cable tele-
vision, and new technological advances increasing the net number of broadcast outlets.
See also Robinson, The FCC and the First Amendment: Observations on 40 Years of
Radio and Television Regulation, 52 MINN. L. REV. 67, 156-59 (1967). Professor Robin-
son asserts that 17% of the electromagnetic spectrum available to broadcasting has yet
to be implemented, and that there are now more broadcasting stations in the United
States than there are newspapers. Id. at 157, 158 n.318.
28. "It is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters,
which is paramount. It is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhib-
ited marketplace of ideas in which the truth will ultimately prevail .... " Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (cita-
tion omitted).
29. Federal Communications Comm'n v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978). The
Supreme Court reasoned that a broadcast of George Carlin's "seven filthy words"
monologue could unexpectedly confront someone in the privacy of his or her own
home, without any prior warning of program content. Id. at 748.
30. See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (a newspaper
"right of reply" statute requiring equal space to be given to those who have been at-
tacked was struck down as being violative of the first amendment).
31. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
32. The fairness doctrine is codified at 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.1910, 73.1920 (1983).
33. In Red Lion, Fred J. Cook, author of GOLDWATER - EXTREMIST ON THE RIGHT,
was denied an opportunity for equal time to rebut an attack made by the Reverend
Billy James Hargis. Hargis accused Cook of working for a Communist-affiliated publi-
cation and writing a "book to smear and destroy Barry Goldwater," among other
things. 395 U.S. at 371.
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mitted to put forth their views to the exclusion of all others.3 4
Thus, the consistent position of the FCC and the courts has been to
regulate broadcasting and limit the expression of the individual
broadcaster in such a manner as to increase the quality and availabil-
ity of ideas to the public at large in such a manner as to enhance
their first amendment interests.3 5
B. The Development of Public Broadcasting
Public broadcasting began more slowly than its commercial coun-
terpart; at the inception of the Communications Act of 1934, noncom-
mercial stations comprised only two percent of all broadcast
licensees.3 6 This may be attributed to stalling by Congress on propos-
als to reserve specified frequency bands for public broadcasting, leav-
ing that matter to the FCC.37
The FCC eventually did reserve twenty FM channels for educa-
tional use in 1945.38 Further development occurred in 1952, when 242
television channels were set aside strictly for education.3 9 However,
actual use of the channels was a different matter. By 1962, only fifty-
four educational television stations were in operation, thereby leav-
ing two-thirds of the nation's population without access to educa-
tional television.40 The heart of the problem was indeed
formidable-insufficient funding.41
A 1967 report by the influential Carnegie Commission on Educa-
tional Television 42 kindled interest and renewed hope in the floun-
dering public broadcasting industry. It called for the formation of a
national corporate entity, funded by the federal government, to ad-
minister and finance public television through a network system.43
This new public broadcasting network would provide cultural, polit-
ical, and educational programming where there had been little or
34. Id. at 392.
35. See Comment, Broadcast Deregulation and the First Amendment: Restraints
on Private Control of the Publicly Owned Forum, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 517, 526-27 (1980).
36. 78 CONG. REC. 8829 (1934).
37. Id. at 8828-29.
38. FCC, REPORT OF PROPOSED ALLOCATIONS FROM 25,000 KILOCYCLES TO 30,000
KILOCYCLES 77 (1945).
39. Sixth Order and Report, 41 F.C.C. 148 (1952).
40. S. REP. No. 67, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1961).
41. Id.
42. Carnegie Commission on Educational Television, Public Television: A Pro-
gram for Action (1967).
43. Id. at 36-37.
none before.44
Congress answered the call to action by enacting the Public Broad-
casting Act of 1967.45 The Act established the federally-funded 46
Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB),47 a non-profit, private
corporation 48 empowered to distribute funds to public broadcasting
licensees.49 The CPB's principle purpose was "to encourage the
growth and development of public radio and television broadcasting
.... "50 a goal which it has by and large achieved.51
C. Congressional Spending Power and the First Amendment
Congress is empowered by the Constitution to spend for the gen-
eral welfare of the nation.52 The definition of what constitutes the
"general welfare" has been "liberally construed to cover anything
conducive to national welfare. . . ."53 What it encompasses is left up
to congressional determination and is not reviewable by the courts. 54
44. Television should serve more fully both the mass audience and the many
separate audiences that constitute in their aggregate our American society.
There are those who are concerned with matters of local interest. There are
those who would wish to look to television for special subject matter, such as
new plays, new science, sports not televised commercially, music, the making
of a public servant, and so on almost without limit. There are hundreds of
activities people are interested in enjoying, or learning about, or teaching
other people. We have been impressed by how much we might have from tel-
evision that is not now available.
Id. at 14.
45. 47 U.S.C. §§ 390-399b (1982).
46. "There is hereby established in the Treasury a fund which shall be known as
the Public Broadcasting Fund. ... Id. § 396(k)(1)(A).
47. "There is authorized to be established a nonprofit corporation, to be known as
the 'Corporation for Public Broadcasting,' which will not be an agency or establish-
ment of the United States Government." Id. § 396(b).
48. Congress went to great pains to insure the independence of the CPB from the
federal government. See generally id. § 396(g)-(k).
49. "The Corporation shall reserve [funds] for distribution among the licensees
and permittees of public television and radio stations .... Id. § 396(k)(3)(A).
50. Id § 396(a)(1).
51. See generally Public Broadcasting Financing Act of 1978: Hearings on H.R.
11100, 12021, and 12073 Before the Subcommittee on Communications of the House
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong, 2d Sess. 109 (1978) (re-
marks of Henry Geller, Assistant Secretary Designate, NTIA).
52. "The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts, and
Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare
.... "1 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
53. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 64-65 (1936).
54. Id. An example of the Supreme Court's apparent reluctance (or recognized in-
ability) to challenge the judgment of Congress in this regard is provided by Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). In Buckley, candidates for federal office challenged, inter alia,
a provision of the Federal Election Campaign Act (2 U.S.C. § 431 (1982)) which
awarded candidates matching federal funds upon the attainment of a specified mini-
mum amount of independent campaign contributions. The Court upheld the statute
against a first amendment challenge.
"Whether the chosen means appear 'bad,' 'unwise,' or 'unworkable' to use is irrele-
vant; Congress has concluded that the means are 'necessary and proper' to promote the
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Indeed, the only limitations on this power are those found in the
Constitution itself.55
The effect of federal spending on first amendment rights was ad-
dressed at length in Cammarano v. United States.5 6 In an action for
the return of federal income tax paid, a businessman contended that,
since his lobbying activities were protected by the first amendment,
the expenses incurred in carrying out the activity could be deducted
from his taxes. Although the Supreme Court implied that lobbying
was an activity protected by the first amendment,5 7 it considered any
tax deduction to be a form of congressional subsidy, and therefore
held that Congress was not required to subsidize lobbying if it chose
not to do so. 5 8 The Court concluded that requiring someone to pay
for a person's exercising of a right is quite different than a per se de-
nial of that right.59
Regan v. Taxation With Representation6O advanced this doctrine
one step further into those activities afforded a congressional subsidy
in the form of tax-exempt status. Taxation With Representation
(TWR) was a non-profit corporation whose principal purpose was to
influence federal taxation legislation. Section 501(c)(3) of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code6l granted tax-exempt status to non-profit organi-
zations, provided they did not expend a substantial portion of their
activities on lobbying. Section 501(c)(4),62 however, allowed an affili-
ate of the section 501(c)(3) organization to lobby without affecting the
tax-exempt status of the parent organization, so long as separate and
independent financial records were kept. TWR brought an action for
declaratory relief, seeking both tax-exempt status and the freedom to
actively lobby without revocation of its tax-exempt status. It based
its arguments on first amendment and equal protection grounds.63
general welfare, and we thus decline to find this legislation without the grant of power
in Art. I, § 8." 424 U.S. at 91.
55. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 91.
56. 358 U.S. 498 (1959).
57. The Supreme Court later held so expressly in Eastern R.R. Presidents Confer-
ence v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 137-38 (1961).
58. 358 U.S. at 498.
59. "Petitioners are not being denied a tax deduction because they engage in con-
stitutionally protected activities, but are simply being required to pay for those activi-
ties entirely out of their own pockets, as everyone else engaging in similar activities is
required to do ...." Id. at 513.
60. 103 S. Ct. 1997 (1983).
61. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (1982).
62. Id. § 501(c)(4).
63. Congress had not imposed any such lobbying ban on veterans' organizations.
TWR claimed this violated its right to equal protection under the fifth amendment,
The Supreme Court began its analysis in Taxation With Represen-
tation by affirming the notion that both tax deductions and tax-ex-
empt status constitute indirect congressional subsidies. By denying
tax-exempt status to legislation-influencing groups, Congress simply
chose not to subsidize their lobbying with public funds,64 a legitimate
exercise of its spending power.65
The concurrence6 6 accepted the majority analysis but added its
own caveat. If the non-profit organization were unable to establish
its own affiliate strictly for purposes of lobbying,67 the statute would
then have been an abridgement of free speech on its face. The con-
curring justices understood the restriction to only prevent tax de-
ductible contributions from being spent on lobbying, and in that vein
accepted the constitutional validity of section 501(c)(3).6 8
III. STATEMENT OF FACTS
Section 399 of the Public Broadcasting Act forbids editorializing by
public broadcasting stations. The Pacifica Foundation, owner and op-
erator of several public broadcasting outlets, 69 brought suit in April
of 1979, along with Congressman Henry Waxman and the League of
Women Voters of California, 70 against the FCC for declaratory relief
prohibiting the enforcement of section 399. The Department of Jus-
tice gave notice that it would not defend the statute, saying that "rea-
sonable arguments cannot be advanced to defend" section 399 against
a first amendment challenge.71 Senate counsel, however, intervened
thus requiring a lifting of the lobbying ban across the board. The Court quickly dis-
pensed with this notion, pointing out that Congress had decided to subsidize veterans'
groups to in some small way compensate them for their past service to the nation, and
thus had a "rational basis" for discriminating against non-veterans. 103 S. Ct. at 2003-
04.
64. TWR relied on Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958), which forbade the at-
tachment of an "unconstitutional condition" to a subsidy, and Perry v. Sindermann,
408 U.S. 593 (1972), which forbade the denial of any benefits to a person because of his
exercise of a constitutional right. The Court distinguished these cases from Taxation
With Representation in that TWR could still receive other funds for non-lobbying ac-
tivities, and that TWR was not denied a benefit solely because of its lobbying. "This
Court has never held that the Court must grant a benefit such as TWR claims here to
a person who wishes to exercise a constitutional right." 103 S. Ct. at 2001.
65. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
66. 103 S. Ct. at 2004. Justice Blackmun authored the concurring opinion, and was
joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall.
67. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
68. 103 S. Ct. at 2004-05.
69. Pacifica owned and operated noncommercial radio stations in New York, Los
Angeles, Washington, D.C., Berkeley, and Houston. Brief for the United States 3, Fed-
eral Communications Comm'n v. League of Women Voters, 104 S. Ct. 3106 (1984).
70. Waxman's interest in the case was that of a viewer wishing to watch and hear
editorials. The League of Women Voters desired to influence the editorial policy of
Pacifica's noncommercial stations. 104 S. Ct. at 3133 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
71. Letter from Attorney General Benjamin R. Civiletti to Senate Majority
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as amicus curiae in place of the FCC.72 The district court dismissed
the action for want of justiciability, citing the lack of a "case or con-
troversy" because of the government's refusal to enforce the editorial
ban.73
The Reagan Administration74 announced in 1981 that it would de-
fend the constitutionality of section 399.75 The case was reopened in
the district court,76 with Senate counsel being allowed to withdraw.
Congress, in an attempt to head off the first amendment challenge,
amended section 399 to ban editorializing only by those stations re-
ceiving grants from the CPB.77 In 1982, however, the district court
ruled that section 39978 violated the first amendment by preventing
public broadcasters from exercising a protected avenue of speech.79
The government appealed directly to the Supreme Court.8 0
Leader Robert C. Byrd (Oct. 11, 1979), as cited by Brief for the United States 13-14,
Federal Communications Comm'n v. League of Women Voters, 104 S. Ct. 3106 (1984).
72. Counsel for the Senate may appear as amicus under 2 U.S.C. § 288 (1984), un-
less such appearance would be untimely or would significantly delay the proceedings.
73. League of Women Voters v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 489 F. Supp.
517, 520 (C.D. Cal. 1980).
74. FCC Chairman Mark Fowler, a Reagan appointee, advocates the deregulation
of broadcasting and the institution of a free market system. As Fowler explains:
Our thesis is that the perception of broadcasters as community trustees
should be replaced by a view of broadcasters as marketplace participants.
Communications policy should be directed toward maximizing the services the
public desires. Instead of defining public demand and specifying categories of
programming to serve this demand, the Commission should rely on the broad-
casters' ability to determine the wants of their audiences through the normal
mechanisms of the marketplace. The public's interest, then, defines the pub-
lic interest.
Fowler & Brenner, supra note 27, at 209-10.
75. It seems strange that the FCC under President Reagan, being committed to
deregulation, would desire to enforce the constitutionality of section 399. This incon-
gruity may be explained by considering the new and equally conservative personnel at
the Department of Justice, who perhaps chose to defend the statute simply as a matter
of a tough "law and order" policy.
76. At this time the district court's ruling was under review in the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals. 104 S. Ct. at 3113.
77. Pub. L. No. 97-35, title XII, § 1229, 95 Stat. 730 (1981) (as amended by 47 U.S.C.
§ 399 (1982)).
78. Section 399 also bans public broadcasting stations from supporting or opposing
candidates for political office. Id. Plaintiffs here did not challenge this provision.
79. League of Women Voters v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 547 F. Supp.
379, 388 (C.D. Cal. 1982).
80. This appeal was made pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1252 (1982), which permits direct
appeal to the Supreme Court from a final judgment ruling a federal law to be
unconstitutional.
IV. THE SUPREME COURT'S ANALYSIS
A. The Standard of Review
Justice Brennan8 l began the Court's analysis by determining the
appropriate standard of review.8 2 The district court had found no
reason to treat broadcasting differently than other media;8 3 conse-
quently, it held that section 399 must further a "compelling govern-
ment interest"8 4 test to survive first amendment scrutiny.8 5
Justice Brennan quickly pointed out that the Court had never
before employed the "compelling government interest" test in re-
viewing the constitutionality of broadcast regulations.8 6 Unique con-
siderations are involved in broadcasting which require a different
treatment than other media in first amendment considerations.8 7
"Spectrum scarcity" demands more regulation for broadcasting be-
cause television and radio are not available to all who wish to use
them.
Justice Brennan cited three principles which govern the evaluation
of broadcast regulations. First, Congress may regulate broadcasting
and issue licenses88 pursuant to the commerce clause.89 Second, Con-
gress has the right to assure the balanced presentation of discussion
on important public concerns. Third, broadcasting is a "vital and in-
81. Justice Brennan was joined in the majority by Justices Blackmun, O'Connor,
Marshall, and Powell.
82. 104 S. Ct. at 3115.
83. 547 F. Supp. at 384.
The district court relied on Federal Communications Comm'n v. Pacifica Found., 438
U.S. 726 (1978), in deciding whether public broadcasting should receive less first
amendment treatment than other media. The Pacifica Court had justified an FCC
regulation restricting the broadcasting of "obscene" material on the basis of two dis-
tinctions between broadcast and print media: (1) the broadcast audience had no prior
warning of program content; and (2) broadcasting is easily accessible to children. Id. at
748-59.
The district court in League of Women Voters, however, flatly rejected these factors
as having no relevance to the editorial ban, and held that no justification existed for
subjecting broadcast regulations to a less stringent first amendment standard.
84. Other standards of review previously used by the Court in first amendment
cases are the "redeeming social value" test, used in obscenity cases (see Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957)); the "clear and present danger" test, used where subversive
activity has been curtailed by state action (developed in Schenck v. United States, 249
U.S. 47, 52 (1919), and Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919)); the "overbreadth"
doctrine, used where laws regulate speech too broadly (see Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U.S. 296 (1940)); and the "void for vagueness" test, used where the bounds of a
statute regulating speech have not been clearly delineated (see NAACP v. Button, 371
U.S. 415, 444 (1963)).
85. 547 F. Supp. at 384.
86. 104 S. Ct. at 3115.
87. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
88. For a glimpse of the broadcast licensing process, see B. COLE & M. OETTINGER,
RELUCTANT REGULATORS: THE FCC AND THE BROADCAST AUDIENCE 133-87 (1978).
89. The Supreme Court first affirmed this notion in Federal Radio Comm'n v.
Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage, 289 U.S. 266 (1932).
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dependent" form of communication that is protected by the first
amendment.90 For example, the fairness doctrine of Red Lion9l re-
quires broadcasters to give equal time to those who have been per-
sonally attacked or have opposing points of view, but does not
mandate the acceptance of all paid political advertisements, such as
would be required of a common carrier. 92 In short, restrictions
placed on broadcasting media have been designed to protect the pub-
lic's first amendment right to receive a balanced presentation of
views bearing great public significance.93
Justice Brennan concluded that the proper standard of review re-
quires the restriction on speech to be "narrowly tailored to further a
substantial governmental interest."94 Its implementation requires an
examination of both the public and the broadcaster's interests "in
light of the particular circumstances of each case." 95
B. Analysis of the Editorializing Ban
Justice Brennan's application of the "substantial government inter-
est" standard began with an analysis of section 399's ban on editorial-
izing and its impact on editorial speech. The subject matter of
editorials-opinions concerning significant political, economic, and so-
cial issues-lies "at the heart of First Amendment protection."96 The
presentation of controversial points of view designed to inspire public
thought and debate is the most important kind of speech, and its ne-
cessity in an informed democracy demands first amendment protec-
tion of the highest degree.97 A broadcaster's dual role of reporter
and editorializer 98 requires him to present such a balanced discus-
sion, satisfying his licensing requirement of operating in the "public
90. 104 S. Ct. at 3116.
91. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
92. Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
93. 104 S. Ct. at 3118.
94. Id. (emphasis added).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. 886 (1982) (upholding an NAACP
boycott of white merchants as a freedom of speech and expression); Mills v. Alabama,
384 U.S. 214 (1966) (striking down a statute forbidding campaign-related editorials on
the day of election); and New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (impos-
ing a higher standard of proof on libel plaintiffs in actions against newpapers, thereby
allowing the press more room to freely report and editorialize); see also Thornhill v.
Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927); and In re Com-
plaint of Accuracy in Media, 45 F.C.C.2d 297 (1973).
98. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 166 (1948).
interest, convenience, and necessity." 9 9
Another important consideration of the editorializing ban is its fo-
cus on content regulation.10 0 In order to enforce section 399, the FCC
must examine the content of the questioned broadcast to ascertain
whether it qualifies as an editorial.10
In light of these considerations, Justice Brennan concluded that
Congress, through section 399, has limited discussion on controversial
public issues by an important class of persons, namely public
broadcasters.102
C. Proposed State Interests Furthered by Section 399
Justice Brennan's view of the ban on editorializing raised a strong
presumption of unconstitutionality. The government proposed three
substantial state interests in support of section 399, contending that
the ban was necessary: (1) preventing noncommercial stations from
becoming instruments of government propaganda; (2) preventing pri-
vate concerns from monopolizing public airtime with their own parti-
san points of view; and (3) preventing public funds from being spent
in promotion of views with which the taxpayer may not agree. 103
The government argued that section 399 was "an indispensible means
of preserving the public's First Amendment interests." 0 4 However,
the Supreme Court, and more particularly Justice Brennan, thought
otherwise.
1. Public broadcasting stations as instruments of government
propaganda
Congress was very much aware of the possibility of undue federal
influence on public broadcasters, and desired to leave the industry
alone to proceed with business as it saw fit.105 Section 399 was added
99. See 47 U.S.C. § 307 (1982).
100. 104 S. Ct. at 3119. A statute regulating the content of speech must be narrowly
tailored to serve a substantial governmental interest. See, e.g., Police Dep't of Chicago
v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972), where the Court struck down a statute prohibiting the
picketing of public schools while in session. The statute made an exception for labor
picketing, thereby violating the first and fifth amendments because it served no sub-
stantial governmental interest and was not "content neutral." Id. at 99.
101. 104 S. Ct. at 3119.
102. See Consolidated Edison v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980), where
the Court stated that "[wihen regulation is based on the content of speech, governmen-
tal action must be scrutinized more carefully to ensure that communication has not
been prohibited 'merely because public officials disapprove the speaker's views.'" Id.
at 536 (citation omitted).
103. 104 S. Ct. at 3120.
104. Id. at 3121.
105. "We wish to state in the strongest terms possible that it is our intention that
local stations be absolutely free to determine for themselves what they should or
should not broadcast." S. REP. No. 222, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1967).
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by way of amendment to the Public Broadcasting Act as a precau-
tionary measure.' 0 6
Congress further ensured the segregation of the CPB and the gov-
ernment by drafting the Act with built-in precautions designed to
keep Congress as far removed from the actual business of public
broadcasting as possible. Such provisions include: (1) the forbidding
of station ownership by the CPB;107 (2) a requirement that CPB
funds be distributed with "objectivity and balance;"' 0 8 (3) the express
disallowance of any federal agency or department from exercising
any "direction, supervision, or control" over public broadcasting sta-
tions or the CPB;109 (4) the establishment of long-term funding for
the CPB;10 and (5) the listing of objective criteria for which local
stations may receive CPB funding."' Thus, the whole of the Public
Broadcasting Act has the effect of preserving autonomy of local pub-
lic broadcasting stations while guarding against potential governmen-
tal abuse."l 2
Even if these limitations did not prevent government "bullying" of
the CPB and local stations, Justice Brennan noted, there is an insuf-
ficient likelihood of federal influence of pressure to justify the ban of
editorializing. Editorials are local in nature and people are primarily
concerned with problems of their own communities."i 3 Such opin-
ions on local matters are not likely to anger Congress to the point of
reducing funding for all public broadcasters. Controversial program-
ming dealing with important issues, which is not considered editori-
106. Some legislators were apparently influenced in part by previous anti-congres-
sional editorials. See Hearing on H.R. 6736 and S. 1160 Before the House Committee on
Interstate Commerce and Foreign Commerce, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 64 (1967).
107. "[The Corporation is prohibited from ... owning or operating any television
or radio broadcast station .... 47 U.S.C. § 396(g)(3)(A) (1984).
108. "[T]he Corporation is authorized to ... facilitate the full development of pub-
lic telecommunications ... with strict adherence to objectivity and balance in all pro-
grams or series of programs of a controversial nature .... " Id. § 396(g)(1)(A).
109. Id. § 398(a).
110. "There is authorized to be appropriated to the Fund, for each of the fiscal
years 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985 and 1986, an amount equal to 50 percent of the total
amount of non-Federal financial support received by public broadcasting entities
. Id. § 396(k)(1)(C).
111. Such criteria include the assessment of the individual station's financial need,
and assuring that each eligible station receives a "basic grant." Id. § 396(k)(6)(A)-(B),
(k)(7).
112. 104 S. Ct. at 3123.
113. The Court points out that, as part of his licensing requirement, the broadcaster
must serve the public interest of the community by addressing local issues. Id. at 3123
n.20.
alizing,114 is often released on a national scale, and has yet to incur
the wrath of Congress in the form of funding cutbacks. Finally, the
ban is far too broad. There is little possibility, as the Court pointed
out, of offending Congress by editorializing on the establishment of
local parks or museums.115
Justice Brennan next addressed the threat of state and local gov-
ernment control of public noncommercial stations, many of whom
are owned by such agencies. 116 Once again, section 399 is overly
broad in that it also applies to stations that are not owned by govern-
mental agencies. Justice Brennan mainly relied on legislative history
which indicates that Congress meant only to "'assure complete free-
dom from any Federal Government influence.' "117 Congress ex-
tended federal aid to such stations knowing full well who owned
them; consequently, Justice Brennan concluded that its failure to re-
strict state and local government control evidences the congressional
intent to treat such stations in the same manner as those privately
owned.1l 8
Finally, Justice Brennan acknowledged the substantial government
interest inherent in assuring the listening and viewing public that a
station's editorials do not reflect government views. But this goal
could easily be accomplished by less restrictive means: the use of a
disclaimer. Such a disclaimer would instantly quell all doubts about
whose views were actually being presented.119
Justice Brennan concluded that section 399 far exceeds any mea-
sure necessary to prevent public broadcasting from becoming a con-
duit for government propaganda. 120
2. Viewpoint monopolization by private concerns
Although Justice Brennan was willing to believe that preventing
private groups from monopolizing editorials on the public airwaves is
114. See In re Complaint of Accuracy in Media, 45 F.C.C.2d 297 (1973).
115. 104 S. Ct. at 3124.
116. Two-thirds of all public television stations are licensed to state public broad-
casting commissions, state universities, and local governmental agencies. THE CORPO-
RATION FOR PUBLIC BROADCASTING, 1982 CPB PUBLIC BROADCASTING DIRECTORY 66-88
(1982), as cited by Brief of the United States 20, Federal Communications Comm'n v.
League of Women Voters, 104 S. Ct. 3106 (1984).
117. League of Women Voters, 104 S. Ct. at 3125 (citing The Public Television Act
of 1967: Hearings on S. 1160 Before the Subcommittee on Commerce, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess. 9 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Pastore) (emphasis added)).
118. Justice Brennan's distinction between federal and state government is not
sound. The first amendment was applied to the states through the fourteenth amend-
ment in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925), thereby forbidding state governments
from abridging freedom of speech. Would the Justice believe differently if such sta-
tions were instead owned and operated by federal agencies?
119. 104 S. Ct. at 3125-26.
120. Id. at 3126.
[Vol. 12: 699, 1985] FCC v. League of Women Voters
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
a legitimate state interest, he doubted section 399's ability to accom-
plish this goal. The same opinions which public broadcasters cannot
expressly make may still be delivered by individuals appearing on
their programming.121 Section 399 therefore has the effect of
preventing only station management from editorial expression. This
places the broadcaster at odds with the Communication Act's affirm-
ative requirement of airing such views in the public interest.122 Be-
cause it already allows private groups to somehow work their
partisan messages into programming, the ban does nothing "to reduce
the risk that public stations will serve solely as outlets for expression
of narrow partisan views."123
Regardless of section 399's ineffectiveness in suppressing view-
points of private groups, the state interest may be furthered by less
drastic means. 124 The fairness doctrine125 ensures the balanced pre-
sentation of controversial viewpoints, so that partisan groups could
not dominate a station's editorials, even if the station so desired.126
Section 399's scope was too broad in this regard, Justice Brennan be-
lieved, and had the net effect of silencing editorial speech instead of
encouraging it.127
3. Expenditure of public funds to promote partisan viewpoints
The Court was not impressed by the government's argument that
taxpayers should not be forced to subsidize speech with which they
may disagree.128 Justice Brennan pointed out that almost every con-
gressional appropriation may anger some taxpayers to a degree.129 If
121. Id.
122. See supra notes 112-13 and In re Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13
F.C.C. 1246 (1949).
123. 104 S. Ct. at 3127.
124. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980), upon
which the Court relied, provides two criteria by which to measure the validity of a
statute purportedly justified by a state interest.
First, the restriction must directly advance the state interest involved; the reg-
ulation may not be sustained if it provides only ineffective or remote support
for the government's purpose. Second, if the government interest could be
served as well by a more limited restriction on commercial speech, the exces-
sive restrictions cannot survive.
Id at 564.
125. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
126. 104 S. Ct. at 3127.
127. Id.
128. In fact, the Court thought so little of this contention that they disposed of it in
a footnote. Id at 3120 n.16.
129. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 91-92 (1976) (per curiam).
Congress had been concerned about offending the public and making
them pay the bill in the process, then the whole Public Broadcasting
Act would be offensive, for opinions may still be expressed in subsi-
dized programming 3 0
Justice Brennan concluded that section 399's ban on editorializing
was far too broad to be justified by any state interests, whether sub-
stantial or not. Furthermore, the public's right to be informed on im-
portant issues was diminished, rather than enhanced, by the
statute.1 3 '
D. Section 399 as an Exercise of Congressional Spending Power
As a last-ditch effort to justify the ban, the government argued
that section 399 was simply an exercise of Congress' power to not
subsidize editorials. Under the rule of Regan v. Taxation With Rep-
resentation,132 Congress could refuse to subsidize lobbying by deny-
ing tax-exempt status to an organization where lobbying comprised a
"substantial part" of its activities, if it chose not to fund such
lobbying.133
Justice Brennan distinguished Taxation With Representation from
the present case on one point alone. A noncommercial station is ab-
solutely barred from editorializing if it receives any federal funding.
Because it cannot segregate its funding according to source, it is even
barred from the utilization of private funds for purposes of editorial-
izing. In Taxation With Representation, the tax-exempt organization
could segregate funding by establishing a financially independent af-
filiate which would conduct lobbying activities on its own, separate
and apart from the parent organization. 3 4
Justice Brennan suggested that section 399 would pass constitu-
tional muster if it provided for an affiliate organization and assured
the independence of its financial status. 3 5 Thus, Congress could re-
fuse to subsidize editorializing as a legitimate operation of its spend-
ing power, while the right of the public broadcaster to air his
opinions, albeit directly, would be secure.136
130. 104 S. Ct. at 3120 n.16.
131. Id at 3127.
132. 103 S. Ct. 1997 (1983). For a more complete discussion of Taxation With Rep-
resentation, see supra notes 60-68 and accompanying text.
133. Id at 2000.
134. Id This distinction lacks forcefulness in light of practicality. If the affiliate
were funded by private sources, then logic dictates that ensuing contributions to the
parent organization would be decreased by that very same amount. The end result
would be that the federal funds would then be used by the parent organization in place
of the private funds given to the affiliate. Both the parent organization and its affiliate
in the end would be funded; what would constitute the technical "source" of the
money should make little or no practical difference.
135. 104 S. Ct. at 3128.
136. The majority opinion in Taxation With Representation does not view the
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E. Conclusion
Justice Brennan concluded the Court's analysis by holding that
section 399 was too broad to serve any legitimate government inter-
ests, some of which were not sufficiently substantial to warrant pro-
tection. Because section 399's ban on editorializing infringed upon
the delivery of an important constitutionally protected form of
speech, it violated the first amendment.1s 7
V. THE DISSENTING OPINIONS
A. Justice Rehnquist
Justice Rehnquist began his dissent by accusing the majority of de-
veloping "a scenario in which the government appears as the 'Big
Bad Wolf' and appellee Pacifica as 'Little Red Riding Hood.' "138 In
reality, he continues, Little Red Riding Hood took the Big Bad Wolf's
food knowing full well she would have to live with his conditions.
Justice Rehnquist principally relied upon Taxation With Represen-
tation as the basis of his dissent, accepting Congress' refusal to pay
for editorials it does not wish to subsidize. Reviewing the history of
the Public Broadcasting Act,139 he concluded that Congress created
the CPB for the purpose of furthering the production of quality edu-
cational, cultural, and public affairs programming. Congress did not
want such programming tainted with partisan ideology. 140
In Taxation With Representation, the refusal to subsidize lobbying
was upheld despite the fact that lobbying was an activity protected by
the first amendment. Failure to subsidize a right does not mean that
it has been infringed.14' The courts may not question Congress' exer-
power to establish a financially independent affiliate as controlling in their upholding
of Congress' right to refuse the subsidy of lobbying. Justice Brennan's view of Taxa-
tion With Representation comes from the concurring opinion authored by Justice
Blackmun, which agreed with the majority only because of the tax-exempt group's
ability to lobby through its affiliate. See 103 S. Ct. at 2004 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
Justice Brennan therefore reinterprets Taxation With Representation to tailor it to
the views of the concurring opinion-an opinion in which he joined.
137. 104 S. Ct. at 3129.
138. Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
139. See supra notes 36-45 and accompanying text.
140. 104 S. Ct. at 3130. Note the differing views of Justices Rehnquist and Brennan
as to what issues are addressed by editorials. Justice Brennan believes them to be mat-
ters of local interest, while Justice Rehnquist assumes they are political and ideological
in nature.
141. 103 S. Ct. at 2003.
cise of spending power, a notion which Taxation With Representa-
tion confirmed.
Justice Rehnquist astutely pointed out that Justice Brennan relied
upon the concurring opinion in Taxation With Representation to jus-
tify his disposal of the spending power argument.142 There is no fea-
sible method of separating federal funding from other money, since
all money is expended on aspects that affect programming: purchase
of equipment, employee compensation, utilities, advertisements, and
the like. Therefore, the only realistic way of preventing the federal
funding of editorializing is by means of a wide, generalized ban.143
Justice Rehnquist likened the present case to Oklahoma v. United
States Civil Service Commission,144 where the Supreme Court up-
held section 12(a) of the Hatch Act,145 which forbade civil service em-
ployees from participating in political activities. This regulatory
power existed because those employees received all or part of their
pay by way of federal subsidy.146
Justice Rehnquist acknowledged that the government cannot at-
tach any condition to funding as it sees fit. The condition must have
a rational relationship to the congressional purpose.147 Here, the edi-
torializing ban is rational because Congress has decided not to fi-
nance an "exercise of partisan politics."148 Congress has really not
suppressed speech at all; the editorial ban is content-neutral149 in
that it enjoins all points of view. Such views may already be ex-
pressed in programming, provided no management endorsement ac-
companies them. 5 0
142. 104 S. Ct. at 3131. See supra note 136.
143. 104 S. Ct. at 3131.
144. 330 U.S. 127 (1947).
145. 18 U.S.C. § 61(1) (1982).
146. Justice Rehnquist appears to have taken Civil Serv. Comm' out of context.
The Hatch Act sought to improve "public service by requiring those who administer
funds for national needs to abstain from active political partisanship." 330 U.S. at 143.
As analyzed by Justice Brennan (see supra notes 103-31 and accompanying text), sec-
tion 399 fails to further the state interests advanced by the government in the statute's
defense.
147. 104 S. Ct. at 3132. The Justice derives this test from Cammarano v. United
States, 358 U.S. 498, 513 (1959). Nondiscriminatory denial of deductions to gross income
was allowed, if not "aimed at the suppression of dangerous ideas." Id.
148. 104 S. Ct. at 3132.
149. Once again, Justices Rehnquist and Brennan clash on conceptual definitions.
Justice Brennan's approach to "content neutrality" considers the category of speech
prohibited and the method of its prohibition, while Justice Rehnquist looks to the sub-
stance of the speech itself. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
150. 104 S. Ct. at 3132. Can station management really present its views through
programming? Creative control lies in the hands of production management, whose
views may be at odds with those who run the station. Other opinions expressed in pro-
gramming may be those of a guest on a talk show, or of another public broadcasting
station sharing its programming. "It hardly answers one person's objection to a restric-
tion on his speech that another person, outside of his control, may speak for him." 103
S. Ct. at 2005 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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The editorial ban is not an "unconstitutional condition" attached to
federal funding, 15 1 Justice Rehnquist asserted, because section 399
imposes a content-neutral ban. Unconstitutional condition cases usu-
ally involve a legislative purpose of banning certain forms of speech,
rather than simply avoiding subsidizing them.152
Justice Rehnquist concluded his dissent by affirming his belief that
section 399 is a rational exercise of congressional spending power. He
would therefore hold that section 399 does not run afoul of the first
amendment.153
B. Justice White
In a one sentence dissent, Justice White concurred with Justice
Rehnquist. He believed section 399's other aspect, the ban on polit-
ical endorsements, goes hand-in-hand with the editorializing ban. Be-
cause Congress can condition funding on the abstinence from
political endorsements, it may likewise condition funding on the ban-
ning of editorial speech. 15 4
C. Justice Stevens
Justice Stevens dissented from the Court's ruling primarily be-
cause he feared that public broadcasting stations could possibly be-
come instruments of government propaganda. "One need not have
heard the raucous voice of Adolph Hitler over Radio Berlin to appre-
ciate the importance of that concern."1 55
Justice Stevens agreed with Justice White that the bans on both
editorializing and political endorsements must be considered to-
gether. He criticized the majority for segregating the two, implying
that this was done because the political endorsement ban would pass
constitutional muster.1 5 6 The Court, he said, has once again provided
preferential first amendment protection for favored avenues of
expression.1 5 7
151. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972), and supra note 64. Strangely
enough, this argument was not addressed by the majority.
152. See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958), and supra note 64.
153. 104 S. Ct. at 3132.
154. Id. (White, J., dissenting).
155. Id. at 3133 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
156. Justice Stevens believes that Pacifica's failure to challenge this aspect of sec-
tion 399-their amended complaint deleted such a count-confirms the importance of
the government interests furthered by the statute. Id at 3134 n.2.
157. See Young v. American Mini-Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 87 (1976) (Stewart, J., dis-
senting): "The fact that the 'offensive' speech here may not address 'important' top-
Justice Stevens could not accept as complete Justice Brennan's
analysis of section 399's effect on speech. He stated that three impor-
tant points must also be considered: (1) Pacifica is still capable of
voicing its opinions through other modes of expression; (2) individual
commentators may still express their personal views through Pacifica
programming; and (3) the editorial restriction is content-neutral.158
He further argued that section 399 protects noncommercial stations'
commentators from being awarded or penalized for their stands on
issues.159
The major justification for the editorializing restriction, however,
lies in the threat of government propaganda.16 0 Section 399 prevents
the government from guiding advocacy, which could otherwise result
in an unwieldy degree of control when combined with the FCC's
power to grant or deny broadcast licenses. The statutory safeguards
cited by the majority 161 are too vague to practically check govern-
ment intervention. Congress, who better understands the "world of
politics," has concluded that the danger is real. Its judgment, Justice
Stevens believed, should not be disturbed when it rests on a rational
basis.162
Justice Stevens did not believe the fairness doctrine would balance
out any de facto government takeover of the airwaves. This is impos-
sible, he claimed, when the doctrine was established by the govern-
ment and is enforced by the government.163
Once again, Justice Stevens rejected the Court's view that section
399 constitutes an invalid content-based restriction. Consolidated
Edison Co. v. Public Service Commission,16 4 cited by the Court for
guidance, concerned opinions on nuclear power inserted in custom-
ers' monthly bills. This form of speech was prohibited by the public
utilities commission, and was struck down as constituting an invalid
"viewpoint-based prohibition."16 5 Consolidated Edison, however, is
ics-'ideas of social and political significance,' .. does not mean that it is less worthy
of constitutional protection." Id.
158. Justice Stevens' view of content neutrality parallels that of Justice Rehnquist.
See supra note 149.
159. 104 S. Ct. at 3135. Justice Stevens also accepted the government's contention
that taxpayers should not be forced to subsidize advocacy they oppose, although he
failed to explain why this constitutes a legitimate state interest. Id. at 3136-37 n.7.
160. Editorials may not be effective conduits for propaganda. An outright expres-
sion of management views may not have the impact of subtle programming content
and presentation. See Comment, The Public Broadcasting Act: The Licensee Editorial-
izing Ban and the First Amendment, 13 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 541, 561-62 (1980).
161. 47 U.S.C. § 396 (1984). See supra notes 107-11 and accompanying text.
162. 104 S. Ct. at 3137.
163. If this were so, the Supreme Court, a "government" entity, could not be impar-
tial in hearing a case involving the government as a party, such as in this case.
164. 447 U.S. 530 (1980).
165. 104 S. Ct. at 3138.
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not applicable to the present case in that the ban on editorializing ap-
plied to all viewpoints, encompassing the entire ideological spectrum.
Because it equally restricts all forms of editorial opinion, and be-
cause it furthers the substantial interest of checking government
propaganda, Justice Stevens would uphold the validity of section
399.166
VI. IMPACT
The Supreme Court's decision in Federal Communications Com-
mission v. League of Women Voters to allow public broadcasters the
right to editorialize appears to bear three significant results. They
are, in increasing order of importance: (1) a reinterpretation of the
Taxation With Representation doctrine concerning government sub-
sidies; (2) the ability of public broadcasters to take stands on contro-
versial issues; and (3) a reaffirmation of Congress' power to regulate
broadcasting in the public interest.
(1) Through his application of Regan v. Taxation With Representa-
tion to this case, Justice Brennan has changed its teachings to the ex-
tent adopted in Justice Blackmun's concurrence. 16 7 Simply stated,
the new meaning of Taxation With Representation is now this: Con-
gress may not forbid a subsidized organization from exercising a pro-
tected mode of speech unless the organization can effectively exercise
that right by means of a reasonable alternative method. Justice
Brennan's interpretation of Taxation With Representation is hardly
surprising; he concurred with Justice Blackmun in that case and has
consistently championed a liberal interpretation of the first amend-
ment.168 It remains to be seen, however, if this new rule will stand
up to subsequent interpretation.
(2) For the first time since the inception of the Public Broadcast-
ing Act of 1967, noncommercial broadcasting stations may expressly
166. Id.
167. See generally supra notes 60-68, 136 and accompanying text.
168. For an insight into Justice Brennan's views on the first amendment, see gener-
ally Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First
Amendment, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1965).
Justice Brennan authored the Court's landmark decision in New York Times v. Sul
livan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), which gave newspapers a first amendment privilege against
malice charges when reporting on public officials. The Justice's first amendment phi-
losophy is succinctly portrayed in the following excerpt from the opinion: "Thus we
consider this case against the background of a profound national commitment to the
principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,
and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp at-
tacks on government and public officials." Id. at 270.
editorialize on issues of public concern. Section 399 has long deprived
the viewing and listening public of an intelligent source of comments
and ideas, one that will perhaps be more willing to go beyond the
staid and noncontroversial stands taken by commercial radio and tel-
evision stations. 69 Justice Stevens' concerns over the use of public
broadcasting stations as instruments of propaganda appear to be un-
founded in practicality. Editorials will, in all probability, continue to
address only local issues which would not inspire the wrath of Con-
gress. As would be expected, leaders in the industry view the deci-
sion warmly, believing that "public broadcasting's full First
Amendment rights can only strengthen its identity as an independent
and essential American journalistic institution free of governmental
interference." 70
(3) Perhaps the most important aspect of League of Women Voters
lies in its effect on the field of broadcast regulation as a whole. Some
believe it represents a willingness on the Court's behalf to reconsider
its specialized first amendment treatment of broadcasting, which
would inevitably result in deregulation.171 This may be the first time
that the Supreme Court has struck down a broadcasting content-
based regulation on first amendment grounds.172
FCC Chairman Fowler particularly welcomed the decision in this
regard,1 73 pointing out two footnotes in the decision which he felt
"recognized that the scarcity argument may not be sound."1 74 The
first footnote indicated that the Court may reconsider its approach to
scarcity as a rationale for regulation should new developments show
otherwise.175 The second footnote would permit reconsideration of
169. "As might be expected, the frequency and quality of commercial editorializing
has not been overwhelming, because of the concern for the alienation of sponsors.
Public broadcasting thus remains a largely untapped source for more extensive and
meaningful editorializing." Comment, The Public Broadcasting Act: The Licensee Edi-
torializing Ban and the First Amendment, 13 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 541, 550 (1980) (foot-
notes omitted).
170. Public Broadcasters Granted Right to Editorialize, BROADCASTING, July 9,
1984, at 34.
171. The Reagan Administration and the FCC support the deregulation of broad-
casting. See supra note 74.
172. See BROADCASTING, supra note 170, at 33.
173. The adversarial process so ingrained in American jurisprudence does not ap-
pear to be well served in this case. The FCC (and for that matter, the entire executive
branch as well) welcomes the prospect of government deregulation, yet is strangely
called upon to defend the very thing it ideologically opposes.
174. Two Tails that Could Wag the Dog in Winning First Amendment Rights,
BROADCASTING, July 9, 1984, at 27.
175. 104 S. Ct. at 3116 n.11, which reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
The prevailing rationale for broadcast regulation based on spectrum scarcity
has come under increasing criticism in recent years .... We are not prepared,
however, to reconsider our longstanding approach without some signal from
Congress or the FCC that technological developments have advanced so far
that some revision of the system of broadcast regulation may be required.
Id.
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the fairness doctrine should it be shown to have a negative rather
than positive effect on first amendment interests.176
Given Fowler's expressed commitment to broadcast deregulation
and his previous efforts in that regard, most notably the 1981 deregu-
lation of radio licensing requirements, 177 such possibilities have seri-
ous implications. At stake is the future viability of congressional
control over radio and television licensing, content, and operation.
Fowler's FCC has made public its desire to repeal the fairness doc-
trine, which the FCC believes to be within its congressional grant of
power to provide for the "public interest, convenience, and
necessity."178
The Court's decision, however, does not justify the deregulators'
happy mood. Although he noted that circumstances could possibly
change the Court's stance, Justice Brennan did not question the va-
lidity of the scarcity concept. 179 Indeed, the Court expressly affirms
Congress' right to regulate the public airwaves, 180 and refers to the
fairness doctrine again and again as a living, breathing, and legiti-
176. "As we recognized in Red Lion, however, were it to be shown by the Commis-
sion that the fairness doctrine 'has the effect of reducing rather than enhancing'
speech, we would then be forced to reconsider the constitutional basis of our decision
in that case." Id at 3117 n.12 (citation omitted).
177. For an analysis of radio deregulation, see Comment, The FCC's New Equation
for Radio Programming: Consumer Wants = Public Interest, 19 DuQ. L. REV. 507
(1981).
178. All the Way?, BROADCASTING, Sept. 10, 1984, at 122.
Possible problems lie on the horizon for the FCC should it choose to follow this
course of action. Section 315 of the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1982),
designed to afford political candidates equal time, provides in pertinent part: "Nothing
in the foregoing sentence [providing for equal time for candidates] shall be construed
as relieving broadcasters ... from the obligation imposed upon them under this [Act]
... to afford reasonable opportunity for the discussion of conflicting views of issues of
public importance."
Thus Congress may have incorporated the fairness doctrine into law, depriving the
FCC of its ability to repeal the doctrine as an administrative manner. See Columbia
Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 110 n.8 (1973); Red Lion
Broadcasting v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 395 U.S. 367, 380 (1969); Kennedy
for President Comm. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 636 F.2d 432, 448 (D.C. Cir.
1980).
179. The deregulators contend that the scarcity argument is no longer viable in
light of the new technologies of cable television, satellite transmission, video cassette
recorders, over-the-air subscription television, and the like. See supra note 27. The
fallacy of this reasoning lies in the comparison of broadcast media to non-broadcast
media. The new technologies are procured by affirmative effort on the part of the con-
sumer, while over-the-air signals pervade virtually every corner of American society,
regardless of solicitation. Thus the concept of scarcity cannot be rebutted by compar-
ing apples with oranges.
180. 104 S. Ct. at 3116.
mate restriction on broadcasters' rights. The whole tone of the opin-
ion upholds the basic notion that broadcasting may be regulated to
further the first amendment interests of those who most need its
protection: the listening and viewing public.
VII. CONCLUSION
It is heartening to know, in these days of deregulatory fervor, that
the Supreme Court still values the first amendment rights of the
broadcast audience along with those of the broadcasters themselves.
Broadcasting is indeed a very powerful and influential tool; it should
not be left in the hands of those who are not answerable to the pub-
lic, those who own the airwaves. Deregulation imperils the free ex-
change of opposing points of view and deletes the broadcaster's
fiduciary duty to act in the public interest.' 8 ' But as long as the
champions of first amendment rights refuse to give up the struggle,
we shall be free of the specter of broadcast deregulation.
MICHAEL R. GRADISHER
181. For a description of the problems facing minorities in their struggle for equal
rights in broadcasting, see Weissman, The FCC and Minorities: An Evaluation of FCC
Policies Designed to Encourage Programming Responsive to Minority Needs, 16
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 561 (1981). As of the date of that article's publication, only
approximately 1.5% of all American broadcast stations were owned or controlled by
minority interests. Id. at 579.
